Introduction
Refugees displaced by wars and famines are an external manifestation of the cyclical failures which affect destabilised nation states and their citizens. Photos of displaced peoples exhibit a pathos opening donors' hearts and wallets to charities established to aid distress. Salamon (1987) recognises that voluntary organisations are the primary response mechanism to social need, but, like the people they aim to assist, charities may also experience cyclical growth and failure. Salamon (1987) formulated voluntary failure theory to explain why governments may respond to such failures at the meta-level. Robbins and Lapsley (2008) draw on Salamon (1987) and suggest that, in addition to government funding, strong stakeholder support is an explanatory feature in voluntary organisations' success. In this paper, we apply and extend Salomon's theory in the international development context to model the significance of competition for the donor dollar in circumstances of a voluntary organisation's failure.
The organisation studied -the Council of Organisations for Relief Service Overseas (CORSO) -pursued an increasingly specific development agenda in the face of new competition from international charities. Thus it lost the support of a national community that had previously provided funding to aid the displaced and foreign poor.
This longitudinal study of the demise of a giant in New Zealand charities, challenges the notion that voluntary failure is imposed from external parties alone, and highlights how jostling for the donor dollar may contribute to organisational failure.
CORSO, an umbrella organisation established to coordinate donations and overseas aid from a broad range of community and religious-based groups began in Three aspects of Salamon's (1987) voluntary failure theory (as described in the following section) are evident in CORSO's history -philanthropic insufficiency, paternalism and, to some extent, particularism. CORSO risked philanthropic insufficiency in the 1960s, but it enlisted vital government support for its international development programmes to mitigate that threat. The rise of international charities in New Zealand in the 1970s exploited the philanthropic paternalism of the donating public at a time when CORSO's change of focus to incorporate development as well as local needs reflected a broadening of its agenda. The donors appeared to prefer charities delivering to those deserving of aid out of New Zealand, yet CORSO sought (what was then) radical change, unheeding the potential impact of philanthropic particularism. Finally, this discussion extends Salamon's (1987) voluntary sector service delivery failure to reflect causes of voluntary organisation failure. That is, Salamon's voluntary failure is of service delivery but it arises due to often astute pragmatic concessions to an immediate (donating) public demand. This supports voluntary organisational vitality at the cost of its mission.
This paper provides a valuable illustration of the importance of maintaining broad-based support in order to reduce the likelihood of donor disaffection and organisational failure.
Data for this research includes both secondary and archival sources. Secondary sources of both a general and CORSO-specific nature were located. Primary source documents in the form of annual reports, correspondence between member group representatives and the organisation, CORSO publications and press releases were accessed from the Alexander Turnbull Library; details of its organisational constitutions were obtained from the Registrar of Incorporated Societies. Primary sources used provided unique challenges, as data are often presented illogically, reflect bias or, in the case of annual reports, contain inconsistencies between years or are discontinuous. Secondary sources, in particular the CORSO 'biography' by Thompson (1969) , the North and South magazine article (McLoughlin, 1991) and several newspaper articles, are replete with concise, although selective, information.
Limitations of such secondary sources include the topicality of their focus. This dictates the chosen 'lens' through which CORSO was viewed and it creates temporal parameters around information utilisation.
The theoretical frame
A number of economic theories attempt to explain why voluntary organisations may be created, including the failure of the market or state to provide public goods and services (Hayes, 1996; Weisbrod, 1988) and an assumed trustworthiness factor that is not shared by counterparts motivated by profit (Ben-Ner and Gui 2003; Hansmann 1987; Seibel and Anheier 1990) . Salamon (1987) argues that the rise of voluntary organisations is the direct result of market failure, with voluntary failure signalling the need for a government response. Voluntary failure has a variety of causes : Fernandez (2008) argues that young, small organisations will decline and that very few organisations fail due to declining socio-political legitimacy. Further, while Fernandez suggests that organisational decline is often related to mission completion and goal fulfilment, this case study does not support these findings. CORSO was large, and the pre-eminent New Zealand charity for over 25 years, yet it lost socio-political legitimacy: the rise of international charities precipitated CORSO's decline.
For this reason, the case study appears to align more with Salamon's (1987) voluntary failure theory which suggests four weaknesses in the voluntary sector in general as shown in Table 1 . He uses organisational examples to describe the sector.
In this paper, we extend Salamon's (1987) voluntary failure theory to organisations per se and the charitable 'market' in which a major organisation operated for over half a century. 
Paternalism
Funds channelled according to wealth-holders governing an organisation who make allocations that inhibit social change. Salamon (1987, 41/42) describes this as the 'Lady Bountiful'
heritage.
Amateurism
Vilification of professional services based on 'best practice' and expensive advertising. Amateur volunteers and low cost options are perceived to be 'charitable ' and 'better'. Salamon (1987, 42) notes this is a largely early twentieth century phenomenon.
Source: Derived and extended from Salamon (1987) As can be seen from Table 1 , philanthropic insufficiency arises when beneficiaries' needs are greater than the funds and resources a charity is able to obtain. Faced by such insufficiency, an organisation may change its mission to generate more funds from a broader range (or a wealthier set) of public donors. Specifically, these fundsgeneration strategies may impose a change of mission or divert energies away from the beneficiaries that were initially targeted by the charity. Either way, insufficiency leads to voluntary failure.
Alternatively, while there may be enough funds to meet all of the community's needs, philanthropic particularism results in one segment being over-served and another under-served. At its extreme, particularism leads to resource wastage when services to particular sub-groups are duplicated and economies of scale are not developed. However, Brinkerhoff (2008) found particularism enabled Coptic Orphans to diversify its donor base beyond first generation Diaspora, so particularism may not, on its own, lead to failure, as it enables a charity to define its niche. That niche does, however, need to be adequately supported so that insufficiency does not arise.
Philanthropic paternalism is a third source of failure described by Salamon (1987) , when wealthier individuals and groups make decisions about which beneficiaries are 'deserving' and how they should be funded. The prime weakness of paternalism is in the dependency relationship created between society's wealth holders and those who are relatively poor. Salamon (1987) quotes the example of arts and culture voluntary organisations aimed at supporting pastimes of the wealthy at the expense of services desired by the poor. It could be suggested that paternalism inhibits social change as it requires the voluntary organisation to conform to the expectation of its wealthy donors, including the expectation that the charity will support those the wealth-holders deem worthy.
Finally, Salamon's (1987) voluntary failure theory defines philanthropic amateurism as a reflection of paternalism and insufficiency. A focus on voluntary effort, 'making-do' and shunning professionalism results in ineffective approaches to beneficiaries' problems (Crampton et al. 2000) . Thus Salamon (1987) until 1975 . Indeed, Prime Minister (1957 Walter Nash willed CORSO a legacy. In this respect, state support reinforced the charity, and provided it with a way to access funding from the public.
The first twenty-five years of CORSO evidenced broadly steady growth, attributable to an inclusive structure favourable to a wide cross-section of member groups. The structure of CORSO to 1965 was one in which a centralised Executive Committee (answerable to member groups) interacted directly with (paid) field staff.
CORSO received increasing fund inflows over that period: rising from an income of $172,000 in 1952 to $2.3 million in goods and $700,000 in cash in 1965 (Thompson 1969) . 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Source: CORSO Annual Reports: 1967 -1982 From 1965 CORSO's field staff experienced a significant number of retirements. Thompson (1969) speculates that although the age and ill-health of certain staff was influential in the turnover at this time, the stress associated with the growing complexity of CORSO may have precipitated these retirements. These internal factors, combined with a steady growth in the number of charitable appeals, presented operating complexities and unexpected expenses. For example, in 1969 CORSO targeted 10% in expenses (so that 90% of donations could go to their cause), but recognised that it needed to advertise in the face of growing competition and that this would lead to higher costs.
Furthermore, political and social developments, from which CORSO was not immune, impacted all organisations. The increased participation of women in paid employment from the 1960s (Tennant 2001 ) reduced women's discretionary time for philanthropic activity and CORSO was particularly reliant on volunteers, due to the labour intensity of material aid handling and 'door-to-door' appeals. Workforce and lifestyle shifts were recognised as a challenge in Thompson's (1969) 'biography' of CORSO, but he stated the organisation was confident in its ability to react to these changes. History shows his confidence was misplaced.
1970-1979: Impact of three critical events
It was the changing social environment facing CORSO from 1970 onwards that precipitated its decline. As noted by Tennant, O'Brien, and Sanders (2008) , global movements in environmental, feminist, indigenous and human rights were translated to the local context in the 1970s, and Māori became more visible in New Zealand society as a result of a growing cultural and political assertiveness. The combination of these factors began CORSO's 'long march to obscurity' (McLoughlin 1991) despite a brief renaissance in the mid-1980s.
While in the early 1970s, CORSO's constituent membership grew (see Appendix 1), internal friction arose between new member groups (who were not apolitical) and the traditional support base of CORSO (Roger 1974a (Roger , 1974b . The impact led to many members leaving between 1975 and 1980 (Appendix 1).
In this section, three episodes from the period 1970 to 1980 are described.
Firstly, by 1972 a changing agenda emerged within CORSO bringing a focus on development rather than aid. Secondly, increased competition from international charities threatened CORSO's revenue stream. Finally, a focus on local poverty, coupled with a change in New Zealand's government, from Labour to National, caused a clash between the government and CORSO resulting in loss of significant government support, also important because government support had previously motivated CORSO's donors.
Critical event one: aid vs. development
By the 1970s, research had shown that reactive aid initiatives, the mainstay of CORSO's prior work, had achieved little long-term amelioration of poverty (Arnold and Glensor 1974; McNamara 1973) . This realisation directed CORSO's attention progressively towards infrastructure development issues in overseas jurisdictions where they had previously provided aid. CORSO publications in 1972 and 1974 detailed the failure generally of aid agencies' initiatives from 1945 to 1972 in addressing the causes of poverty through a relief focus (Arnold and Glensor 1974) .
Over this period Balasuriya (1974) noted the relative economic position of developing countries had deteriorated in contrast to the post-World War II boom in North America and Australasia. From 1950 to 1970 the contribution to global exports of these developing countries declined from 32% to 18%, on deteriorating terms of trade.
In addition, their Gross National Product (GNP) grew by just 25% from 1960-69, to a nominal average of US$218 per capita, and developing country debt grew from US$37.5 billion to US$59.3 billion between 1965 and 1969 . Small (1997 stated that Balasuriya's (1974) challenge was heard by every aid agency in the world, but few took action -perhaps due to a traditional, paternalistic attitude.
CORSO, however, responded to the deteriorating situation by focusing increasingly on the causes of underdevelopment and poverty (Balasuriya 1974) . It saw the previous practice of providing material aid from 'clothes drives' as ineffective and (from the late 1960s) expensive when the cost of handling and transporting clothing was considered (CORSO Annual Report, 1968 -1969 concern in relation to the magnitude of administration costs and the amount of funds reaching the intended destination. Women believed that those active in the charity sought self-enrichment (some citing they had donated clothing for overseas aid only to see it being worn locally by CORSO collectors). Both groups expressed concerns that donated funds failed to reach intended beneficiaries and articulated a preference for charities focused on domestic needs (Survey one 1973).
These respondents voiced a primary concern that aid should respond to hunger, a point reiterated in a second more substantive survey (502 respondents) in which 66% identified hunger as the priority for aid (Research International Limited 1973 (Roger 1974a (Roger , 1974b . Disquiet over CORSO's changing direction was also articulated at the fourth Annual Regional Conference held in Gore Source: CORSO Annual Reports: 1967 -1982 1985 McLoughlin 1991; Overview 1991 Overview , 1987 CORSO AGM 1990 .
The rising expenses revealed in Figure 3 are particularly important in light of public concerns that the proportion of appeal collections reaching those they were intended to benefit should be maximised (Survey one 1973; Research International Limited 1973) . The 1978 Annual Report noted that expenses absorbed 36% of revenue. Financial indicators, while not being central to CORSO's decline, can be seen to reflect the impact of the organisation's changing 'fortunes', both financial and non-financial.
Critical event two: Competition in the foreign aid market
The 1970s evidenced the arrival of various international aid-agency charities to New
Zealand. Previously, rivalry between charitable organisations had been restrained or low-key, especially as CORSO acted as an umbrella organisation for aid overseas. These professional fund-raising tactics were at variance with CORSO's modus operandi and made CORSO vulnerable to the newly-arrived aid agencies' exploitation of the philanthropic paternalism of NZ society, result in declining donor dollars 2 (Small 1997) . In addition, this new type of fund-raising required less labour than CORSO's door to door appeals and clothes collections and was more effective than CORSO's postal appeals.
The professional campaigns of these international charities proved successful in mobilising public support (McLoughlin 1991) , and this is reflected in their income growth. In contrast, CORSO's public profile was one of an increasingly confused and factious political organisation. Figure 4 shows the extent to which other international aid agencies prospered compared to CORSO (Hutching 1994 A member of CORSO, but also an aid agency in its own right, the Christian World Service (CWS) experienced a similar range of external influences to CORSO (Lovell-Smith 1986) . Despite this, CWS continued to grow and prosper (see Figure 4) . Although not unique to CORSO, growing donation specification from 1985 contributed to inflexibility of funds application (Hutching 1994 ). CORSO's 1986
Annual Report refers to financial difficulties related to increasing specification of both donations and legacies. For example, in 1984 $63,617 of donations were specified relative to $880,000 total income (7.2%), but this increased to $453,234 in 1985 against of $1.7 million total income (26.6%) (CORSO Annual Report 1986). Growing donation specification from 1985 contributed to inflexibility of funds application (Hutching 1994) . One measure to ameliorate disaffection was a constitutional structural change (as shown in Figure 5 ). Many of the key voluntary personnel remaining were disenchanted with CORSO's direction and fractiousness and they deserted the organisation in 1990 to establish Oxfam (NZ) (Morrison 1991) as an alternative to supporting World Vision.
The Governor-General Dame Catherine Tizard, and prominent New Zealander Sir Edmund Hillary both became patrons of Oxfam, and were among many CORSO supporters switching their allegiance to that organisation (Hutching 1994 ).
To combat negative press from dissatisfied members, CORSO compared its (Holdom 1997; 1998) . In this view transnationals are seen as 'villains'. The IMF is viewed as seeking control of developing countries, imposing demands on them for economic reform as loan conditions. Notably, in recent times orthodox economists of the IMF have arrived at a much more qualified view of the necessary benefits that obtain from free trade and global financial liberalization (Prasad et al. 2003) . This gives some support to CORSO's position on international trade. Contemporary CORSO is beyond the purview of this study; however the perception by this body that there is value in the historic 'brand' name of CORSO appears to lead to this GATT 'Watchdog' continuing to use the CORSO name.
Discussion
Over the years CORSO has come to be viewed as a fringe group promoting a radical agenda. Its focus on attacking capitalism and addressing Māori poverty was a path that the New Zealand public were unwilling to follow (Hutching 1994) , coming on top of CORSO's 1970s development agenda which, itself, had been only partially supported. While members directly involved in aid had a greater understanding of this agenda and its merits, the general population were not persuaded (Applied Research Consultants 1987) and, instead, increasingly supported new international aid organisations established in direct competition to CORSO. The collapse of this national charity 'brand' marked by first a weakening and then the disappearance of CORSO from its formerly dominant position comprises a type of failure explained by Salamon's (1987) in terms of insufficiency, particularism and donor paternalism.
Initially, CORSO appeared to have sufficient resources to meet its mission.
Yet, it shunned these reliable resources and support to make an initially controversial mission change in the direction of development (rather than aid) in 1972. This led to waning public support and potential philanthropic insufficiency (e.g. Otago Daily Times 2000; Survey one 1973). The preference for development initially resonated with neither donors nor supporters, and CORSO's governing body deemed it essential to educate its stakeholders as to the benefits of this approach (e.g. Arnold and Glensor 1974) . Their message (backed by Balasuriya 1974) was that crisis aid had been a 'band-aid', but funding well-developed infrastructure in developing countries would reduce the need for such aid. In risking insufficiency with a mission change, CORSO confronted donor paternalism. CORSO's message of development challenged donors' or supporters' commonly held belief that 'deserving poor' needed 'band aids'. New international aid-agencies increasingly espoused similar developmental views, and expanded rapidly in New Zealand (see Figure 4) , showing that part of this message was persuasive. Therefore we do not believe that the 'aid vs. development' decision was fatal to CORSO; effectively communicating the reasons for change, and reinstated government support (tax-exempt status), would have enabled CORSO to overcome philanthropic paternalism.
However, philanthropic insufficiency and particularism were different matters, This was evidenced in the rise of international charities in direct competition, in combination with confusion arising from CORSO's changed direction. Insufficiency and particularism describes the voluntary sector's failure to optimally meet beneficiaries' needs. Public scrapping for the donor dollar led to CORSO's inability to generate sufficient resources. A CORSO newsletter accused Oxfam of a 'foreign takeover bid' (Small 1991) and CORSO rebuked Christian Children's Fund for coming to New Zealand (Overview 1991) , suggesting there could be duplication of services to particular beneficiaries. In relation to CORSO, its inability to 'beat' the competition to the donor dollar caused its failure as a leading charity organisation. By 1977 it had lost its place as the largest charity in New Zealand.
In addition, CORSO's decision to change membership policy exacerbated its voluntary failure. The inclusive membership philosophy that had served the organisation well for thirty years did not allow it to respond appropriately to diverging and increasingly politicised beliefs and objectives. Typically, successful coalitions rely on sufficient goal-based convergence to maintain coherence. Therefore, continuing constituent identities' philanthropic focus required strong, centralised internal control. CORSO's initial non-combative and inclusive approach attempted to broker this goal congruence but did not stand it in good stead when more politically active members joined the organization. Association (Roger 1974a (Roger , 1974b . Disaffection, both internally and throughout the wider community, was a consequence of CORSO's changed political direction. This saw the decline in constituent members from 57 in 1974 to 38 in 1983 (see Appendix 1) and, in turn, reduced financial support from the public for CORSO from 1973.
Strong leadership was required to inspire support from the broader constituency, whose active support was uniquely essential to CORSO's fund inflows. While one possible conjecture is that the organisation did not recognise the inextricable link between CORSO's potential for voluntary failure and the continuing need to retain broad-based support to attract funds in the face of governmental apathy or distrust, CORSO also suffered from the government opening up the charity market.
This case study shows that Salamon's (1987) theory of voluntary failure can be extended beyond government support of voluntary organisations to consider supporters of these organisations and the market in which they operate. In the case of CORSO and philanthropic paternalism, it is suggested that donors (rather than CORSO) were paternalistic. Donors expected aid to be delivered overseas and shunned the notion that there could be poverty 'at home' and that Māori sought selfdetermination. In so doing, donors sought to direct wealth toward the 'deserving poor' which they narrowly defined, while CORSO perceived that radical political change was necessary. Therefore, while paternalism could be construed as part of CORSO's failure, it was the inability of CORSO to promote radical change to wider stakeholder groups that led to this voluntary failure.
Conclusion
CORSO began life as a voluntary organisation coordinating activities geared towards overseas relief. As such it was 'home-grown' but eventually failed when international competition captured the donor dollar. This was preceded by an attempt to overcome donor paternalism in the late 1960s, when CORSO focused increasingly on development (rather than aid) to build foundations for impoverished peoples overseas to gain greater self-reliance. This change in strategic direction was insufficiently communicated to the general public, although it was generally accepted within the organisation.
The public disaffection, caused by donor paternalism and the rise of other options for donors, combined to generate philanthropic insufficiency for CORSO.
However, it was not an insufficiency that called for government intervention, but one brought on by the rapid growth of similar aid/development organisations. The beneficial move to development (rather than aid) was delayed. No doubt needy people suffered because of this as agencies colluded to encourage donor paternalism.
Key to the demise of this giant in New Zealand charities was the fact that their change in strategic direction resulted in a philosophical shift unsupported by many of its core (orthodox) member bodies. These constituent members had previously supported the deserving poor in a type of philanthropic paternalism (Salamon 1987 
